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A ‘less indigenous’ language of South Sudan     
Stefano Manfredi and Mauro Tosco 
  
Abstract 
This article explores the official discourse behind the regimentation of the linguistic 
situation of South Sudan and assesses its impact on local linguistic practices against the 
backdrop of a sociolinguistic survey and interviews with government officials. After a 
presentation of the language situation of the country, the article focuses on Juba Arabic and 
its unrecognized status as the only lingua franca of South Sudan. The Constitution of the 
country nominally recognizes and enshrines the language diversity of the country, but does 
not come to grips with the existence of Juba Arabic, an Arabic-based pidgincreole which is 
the only unifying language of a vast portion of the country and the first language of the 
capital. 
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1 Introduction1  
South Sudan acquired independence on 2 July 2011 and is the youngest nation-
state to have gained general recognition and membership in the UN. The post-
independence political situation in South Sudan took a rapid downturn in 
December 2013, when open war erupted between forces loyal to President Salva 
Kiir Mayardit and those siding with his former Vice-President, Mr. Riek Machar. 
Against this precarious background, the present article depicts a language policy 
in the making, which has not been implemented (and possibly will never be). The 
problems it addresses (and maybe contributes to create) are instead real and 
continue to beleaguer the country. In South Sudan, as elsewhere, political bodies 
and people cope with language diversity on the basis of different assumptions and 
interests. This is because the vertical organization of languages as regimented by 
language policies rarely (if ever) matches the complex horizontal distribution of 
languages (Ricento, 2005; Blommaert, 2007; Blommaert and Rampton, 2011). In 
the case of South Sudan, while all the ‘indigenous languages’ have been granted 
the status of national languages, the government overtly chose to exclude from its 
language policy the most widespread means of interethnic communication of the 
country, which is the Arabic-based pidgincreole (see 2 below) commonly called 
Juba Arabic. 
 Juba Arabic presents the usual problems of many creoles (Léglise and Migge, 
2007): it shows a high degree of individual variation, it lacks an established 
written norm and draws its lexicon ‒ but not its grammar ‒ from its lexifier and 
former dominant language represented by Sudanese Arabic. Descriptive and 
comparative research on creole languages has showed that creoles are socially and 
linguistically systems on their own and they are clearly distinct from their 
lexifiers (Winford, 1997). In contrast, we will show that Juba Arabic is officially 
equated to Sudanese Arabic. In this regard, it should be remarked that linguistic 
differentiation always involves ideologically embedded and socially constructed 
processes (Irvine and Gal, 2000). This is the core point of view of globalization 
studies, which postulate that named languages are ideological constructions tied 
to the emergence of nation-states and that there are not truly distinct linguistic 
systems bounded by grammars and communities (Blommaert and Rampton, 2011; 
Jørgensen, Karrebæk, Madsen and Møller, 2011). Contrary to these assumptions, 
linguistics stresses that structural differences do indeed exist, and they 
characterize at least that subset of the world’s languages, which Kloss (1967) 
defined as ‘Abstand languages’ (cf. Tosco, 2017). In a globalization perspective, 
language borders are instead conceived as means of social categorization, which 
are only relevant when the speakers deliberately construct them (García and Wei, 
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2014). Interestingly enough, the independence of South Sudan corresponded, on 
the one side, to the creation of state internal language borders by means of the 
imposition of the ‘indigenous language’ category and, on the other side, to the 
erasure of the external linguistic border between Juba Arabic and its lexifier. In 
the light of the above, the aim of this article is to identify the ideological 
guidelines of the South Sudanese language policy and to evaluate their impact on 
local language uses and practices. 
 The present study is based on a multi-methodological fieldwork carried out in 
Juba, in July-August 2013.2 The quantitative part of the fieldwork was intended to 
draw an overview of the sociolinguistic situation of Juba based on a statistical 
survey on multilingualism and language uses. The survey, which was conducted 
with oral questionnaires, included information on age, gender, ethnic affiliation, 
residence, literacy, patterns of multilingualism and language uses for each 
respondent. The survey is primarily meant to assess the degree of nativization (i.e. 
first language acquisition) of Juba Arabic. Furthermore, speakers’ interpretation 
of their language uses allows for insights into the impact of language policies on 
language practices. As far as the qualitative fieldwork is concerned, it consists of 
two parts. The first part was concerned with metalinguistic representations and 
attitudes towards Juba Arabic vis-à-vis Sudanese Arabic and other South 
Sudanese languages. The data were elicited through formal interviews in Juba 
Arabic and English. Due to space limitations, we will not present these data in 
detail here, and we will limit ourselves to an outline of local language attitudes 
(see Manfredi, 2017b). The second part investigated the official discourse about 
Juba Arabic and the category of ‘indigenous languages’. This part of the research, 
which represents the bulk of this paper, is based on interviews with government 
officials and it is meant to decrypt the State ideology lying behind the 
promulgation of its language policies and eventually to assess its influence on 
language uses and attitudes. 
 The paper is organized as follows; section 2 briefly draws the linguistic 
situation of South Sudan. Sections 3 and 4 respectively analyse the general lines 
of the South Sudanese language policy and the institutionalization of the 
‘indigenous language’ category in the light of the colonial and postcolonial 
language policies. Section 5 presents the results of the sociolinguistic survey 
conducted in Juba and serves as a prelude to section 6 which deals with the 
official discourse about Juba Arabic and ‘indigenous languages’. Finally, section 
7 summarizes the ideological load of the South Sudanese language policy by 
highlighting its lag with respect to the position of Juba Arabic. 
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2 Language in the South Sudan and the special place of (Juba) 
Arabic  
The linguistic landscape of South Sudan is fairly complex; Ethnologue (Lewis, 
Simons and Fennig, 2016) lists 68 spoken languages. While no single language is 
shared by even a majority of the population, since at least the late 19th century 
some form of Arabic has been the most widespread medium of interethnic 
communication. Which Arabic is more difficult to say. 
 First, we have an Arabic-based contact variety generally referred to as árabi 
júba (i.e. Juba Arabic) and whose historical origin can be traced back to Egyptian 
colonial expansion in the 19th century (Manfredi, 2017a; Tosco and Manfredi, 
2013). Juba Arabic originated out of an extreme contact situation in which 
enslaved Nilotic populations were forced to communicate with Arabic-speaking 
traders coming from northern Sudan and Egypt. This provided the sociolinguistic 
context for the rise of a pidginized form of Arabic and in due time of modern Juba 
Arabic. Even if Juba Arabic is traditionally considered a pidgin, a better label is 
pidgincreole, i.e. an intermediary category between pidgins and creoles which is 
defined by the fact that an earlier pidgin has become the first (and possibly the 
only) language only for a part of its speakers (cf. section 5.2). Juba Arabic shows 
a drastic restructuring of its lexifier language (Sudanese Arabic) and is not 
mutually intelligible with any Arabic variety. Structurally, Juba Arabic displays 
typical features of creoles, such as the almost complete shunning of morphology, 
the lexification of uninflected verbal forms and the expression of TMA 
distinctions through invariable preverbal markers (Tosco and Manfredi, 2013). 
Therefore, even if most of the Juba Arabic lexicon is Arabic-derived and Juba 
Arabic does not bear an autonomous glossonym (Miller, 2009), it cannot be 
considered a variety of Arabic.3 Juba Arabic speakers have a very clear 
metalinguistic consciousness of the distinctiveness of their language and show a 
positive attitude toward it (Manfredi, 2017b). In most cases, this does not contrast 
with a general appreciation of the ‘indigenous’ languages and of English. 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the state’s language ideology (cf. section 6), a 
majority of speakers view the use of Juba Arabic positively, and they consider it 
their first language. Finally, they pragmatically argue that Juba Arabic is the only 
linguistic means that can facilitate interethnic communication and may overcome 
‘tribalism’ in South Sudan. 
 Second, one finds Sudanese Arabic, which is widely spoken by people of 
northern Sudanese descent and many South Sudanese educated in Arabic and/or 
who spent the civil war period in northern Sudan. 
 Third, different non-native varieties of Arabic (generally referred to as árabi al 
besít, ‘simple Arabic’) are used as an interethnic medium in the north (around the 
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city of Malakal) and west (around the city of Wau) of South Sudan, as well as in 
peripheral regions of Sudan. Data on these vehicular varieties are scarce, mainly 
as a consequence of their high degree of individual variation. Even if both 
Sudanese Arabic and non-native varieties of Arabic have some linguistic impact 
on Juba Arabic (Versteegh, 1993), creole speakers tend to keep all three apart 
(Manfredi, 2017b). In contrast to this, the official discourse claims that Juba 
Arabic is a variety of Arabic and that it cannot therefore be considered an 
‘indigenous language’ of South Sudan (cf. section 6 and 7). 
   
3 Language in the Constitution(s)  
The present-day South Sudan language policy finds its immediate origins in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (hereafter CPA), signed in 2005 between the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan. Also 
referred to as the ‘Naivasha Agreement’, it brought to a substantial stop the 
second Sudanese civil war, and paved the way to the independence of the South in 
2011. 
 The language side of the CPA has been discussed and analysed in detail by 
Abdelhay (2006, 2007), Abdelhay, Makoni and Makoni (2011) and Makoni, 
Abdelhay and Makoni (2013). Following the CPA, Sudan formally moved from a 
strict Arabic monolingualism to a policy of multilingualism, where both Arabic 
and English were recognized as official languages, whereas other ‘indigenous’ 
languages were accorded the status of national languages. Writing well before the 
referendum on independence and the current intra-South civil war, Abdelhay 
(2007:17) closed his article with the hope that ‘a faithful implementation of this 
decentralised language policy within the suggested multi-ethnic federalist system 
will not only contain (i.e. prevent) the southern potential secessionism but also the 
divisive monolingualism’. What actually happened is very different. 
 At the constitutional level, the results of the CPA found a first implementation 
in the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (which came 
into force on 9 July 2005) and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (5 
December 2005, and following a draft constitution proposed by the Southern 
Sudan Civil Society in Nairobi, February 2005). For South Sudan the provisions 
on language read as follows: 
1) All the indigenous languages of Southern Sudan are national languages 
and shall be respected, developed and promoted. 
2) English and Arabic shall be the official working languages at the level of 
the governments of Southern Sudan and the States as well as languages 
of instruction for higher education. 
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3) There shall be no discrimination against the use of either English or 
Arabic at any level of government or stage of education. 
4) English, as a major language in Southern Sudan, and Arabic, shall be the 
official working languages at the level of the governments of Southern 
Sudan, and the states and the languages of instruction for higher 
education. 
5) In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-level of 
government in Southern Sudan may adopt any other national language 
as an additional official working language or medium of instruction in 
schools at its level.  
Summing up, the salient points on language policy of the 2005 Constitutions are: 
 Arabic-English official national bilingualism. 
 The official status of Arabic and English is based upon the language 
being a ‘widely spoken’ medium; while this is partially true for Arabic, 
English is hardly a spoken language at all in South Sudan. 
 The possibility of multilingualism at lower levels of government 
promulgated by the CPA is lost.  
Like its predecessors, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, which came 
into force with independence in 2011, does not list languages to be implemented, 
but still refers to the ‘indigenous languages of South Sudan’. Its references to 
languages (Chapter 1, Article 6) are also much shorter: 
1) All indigenous languages of South Sudan are national languages and 
shall be respected, developed and promoted. 
2) English shall be the official working language in the Republic of South 
Sudan, as well as the language of instruction at all levels of education. 
3) The State shall promote the development of a sign language for the 
benefit of people with special needs.  
Arabic has disappeared, together with any reference to official multilingualism at 
the local level. English remains the sole official language and is promoted ‘at all 
levels of education’. Apart from a generic respect for, development of and 
promotion of ‘indigenous languages’, the Constitution represents a clear 
regression in terms of provisions for multilingualism. While, as remarked by 
Abdelhay (2007:9), the Sudanese Constitution of 1988 offered to all ‘indigenous 
peoples’ the right to preserve their languages, cultures and religions, ‘indigenous 
languages’ are nowadays enshrined as national languages; but, as noted again by 
Abdelhay (2007:9), such a generic statement is a ‘non-instrumental language 
right’ (following Rubio-Martín’s 2003 terminology): it attaches a symbolic value 
to all local languages ‒ while paying, we add, lip-service to language diversity. 
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 The Constitution of the single states may flatly contradict that of the central 
government; the 2005 Interim Constitution of Central Equatoria stated inter alia 
that ‘English and Arabic shall be the official working languages at all levels of the 
government of the State as well as languages of Instruction for higher education’. 
This State Constitution therefore predates the 2011 Transitional Constitution and 
reflects the fact that Arabic is widely used in Central Equatoria and that Bari is 
the first ethnic language of the region.4 
  
4 Education and the ‘indigenous languages’  
How do the constitutional provisions reflect on everyday educational practices? 
Not much, and not well. What little education exists in South Sudan is by and 
large in English, and locally either Arabic or an ‘indigenous’ language is used. 
The Government’s educational policy remains unclear, and interviews conducted 
at the Ministry of Education did not reveal much, only that primary education in 
‘indigenous’ languages is planned; however, neither the exact number of the 
languages nor a timetable were made available to us. Most importantly, it is not 
clear which language will be taught where and to whom. Education in the 
‘indigenous’ language is planned for the first three years of primary school, with 
English being introduced in the fourth year. In this context, it seems that language 
uses rather than ethnic membership will be taken into account in choosing the 
‘indigenous’ language; on the other hand, ethnic membership is also evoked as a 
criterion for selecting the ‘indigenous’ language in primary education (cf. section 
6). The risks involved in such an approach are evident, especially in the absence 
of a true federal system where decisions about language policy are placed in the 
hands of local authorities. 
 Various interviews with chief executives at the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology made it clear that public education in the ‘indigenous languages’ 
will for the time being be provided in Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Zande, Lotuko 
and Moru. These are the languages with the highest number of speakers but are 
also strictly ethnic languages and play no role in interethnic communication. As a 
bequest of the British colonial policy, these are the same languages that had 
already been selected at the 1928 Rejaf Language Conference as ‘suitable for 
development’. The Rejaf Conference, which also prescribed the use of the Roman 
script, even for writing down ‘colloquial Arabic’, has had enduring effects on 
language ideologies in South Sudan: the ‘Rejaf ideology’ has been tacitly 
assumed by the new independent government of the country, starting from the 
very use of the adjective ‘indigenous’. ‘Indigenous’ is a technical term in the 
Sudan that finds its origin in the British political and educational discourse from 
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the 1930s onwards, and it is part and parcel of an ‘indirect rule’ system embodied 
in a set of measures aiming at the creation of ‘self-sufficient’ cultural identities. 
As a result, ‘[T]o solidify communal identification, the British rule discouraged 
the searching out of commonalities that transcend differences such as common 
language and culture by accentuating differences even when none existed’ 
(Abdelhay, Makoni, Makoni and Mugaddam, 2011:468–469). The authors’ claim 
goes hand in hand with the idea that colonial linguists’ work reduced multilingual 
practices to grouped artefacts – ‘real languages’ (Abdelhay, Makoni, Makoni and 
Mugaddam, 2011:471). Such a creation ex-nihilo of differences is not 
exemplified, but actually occurred in colonial Sudan (a case in point is the 
creation of a Laggorí identity in the Nuba Mountains; Manfredi, 2015). Ditto for 
the linguists’ work: the quest for the ‘native speaker’ and ‘mother tongues’ has 
been, and partially still is, a scientific posture of much descriptive linguistics ‒ 
and as such, not an invention of the British administration. Obviously, it is at odds 
with multilingualism, diglossia, all the messiness of contact situations, multiple 
and shifting ethnic and language allegiances, and so on. What is more important is 
that language description and even more so language standardization favour the 
crystallization of ethnic boundaries, and in the former unified Sudan they were 
instrumental to the empowerment of ethnic groups. 
 The fact that much of what is known on the Southern Sudanese languages is 
due to the painstaking work of the worldwide no-profit Summer Institute of 
Linguistics (hereafter SIL) did not help: descriptive work is coupled in this case 
with a special emphasis on a speaker’s first, ‘native language’ as a focal part of 
his/her identity and a source of personal and community self-esteem. As noted by 
Handman (2009:637), ‘[A] speaker’s first, native language holds a special place 
in Christian translation literature, as the language in which the Scriptures and 
other material can best be understood by receptor communities’. Handman draws 
attention to the potential disruptive effects of the imposition of non-native 
language ideologies on local communities, and what is valid for the ‘native 
speaker’ applies of course also to the whole ‘mother tongue’ ideology, whose 
historical origins in European modern times have been described by Bonfiglio 
(2010).5 
 Finally, ‘indigenous’ languages exclude ‘foreign’ languages: Arabic is the first 
casualty, notwithstanding the presence of many Arabic monolinguals (cf. section 
5). Arabic is also ignored at the official level ‒ although it is much better known 
than English and very much in use. 
 Juba Arabic is likewise excluded, mainly because of the direct association with 
its lexifier language, although it is the everyday language in the capital, Juba, and 
in much of the country. Things for Juba Arabic are actually even worse, because 
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Juba Arabic is itself an exclusively oral and non-standardized language (although 
it has by now quite a long written history; Miller, 2014). 
 What do South Sudanese think about this language? How do they rate its 
degree of independence vis-à-vis Arabic? How do they use it, when and with 
whom? 
 The results of our research clearly show (cf. section 5) that Juba Arabic has a 
substantial body of first-language speakers; they still belong ethnically to differ-
ent ethnic groups and do not see themselves as a new ‘entity’. The possibility of 
belonging to an ethnic group without speaking its language was specifically 
addressed in the interviews and generally answered in the positive by our respon-
dents, who often admitted a low or no competence at all in their ‘indigenous’ 
languages. The idea that Juba Arabic is ‘the’ language of South Sudan crops up 
from time to time in our interviews, and is often voiced in popular music and on 
the Internet. Connected to this is the problem of the very name of the language, an 
issue which a few respondents were well aware of: being ‘Arabic’ points to a 
foreign entity, while being ‘Juba’ restricts it to a specific location. Before 
addressing the official discourse related to these issues in section 6, section 5 will 
provide some figures on the extent and spread of Juba Arabic in present-day Juba. 
  
5 Juba: Which language(s), where?  
5.1 The sample 
The first part of our fieldwork was spent on a qualitative evaluation of the degree 
of multilingualism and the linguistic uses by means of a sociolinguistic survey. In 
order to assess the status of Juba Arabic in Juba, two districts were chosen: 
Malikiya, the heart of ‘old Juba’, traditionally inhabited by mainly Muslim ethnic 
Bari; and Gudele, one of the new residential areas, extending to the West of Juba 
town (see Table 1).6 
 Within each district 50 households were investigated, for a total number of 314 
interviewees. The higher number of interviews in Malikiya stems from a higher 
ratio of individuals per household (3.79 vs. 2.48). The low rate of individuals per 
family is partially explained by the very high rate of infants and by the fact that 
answers were provided on an individual basis. 
 The sample brings to the fore the very recent inflow of migrants: Juba is a 
young town, where the average age is 31.5, but as low as 28.6 in Gudele. Even 
more importantly, Juba is a relatively ‘new town’: less than a half of the inter-
viewees were born in the town, while even in the historical district of Malikiya 
the percentage born there is only 49%. A total of 46% of interviewees settled after 
2005. In Gudele, newcomers account for almost three out of four inhabitants. 
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Table 1. The survey sample. 
 
 Gudele Malikiya Total 
Households 50  50  100 
Individuals = Ratio 124/50 = 2.48 190/50 = 3.79 314/100 = 3.14 
Age (average) 28.6 34.4 31.5 
Gender M 67 (54%) 
F 57 (46%) 
M 74 (39%) 
F 116 (61%) 
M 141 (45%) 
F 173 (55%) 
Length of stay in Juba: 
Born in Juba 
Arrived after 2005 
Arrived before 2005 
 
22 (17.7%) 
92 (74.1%) 
10 (9.2%) 
 
93 (49%) 
54 (28.4%) 
43 (22.6%) 
 
115 (36.6%) 
146 (46.4%) 
53 (17%) 
Education: 
University 
Secondary 
Primary 
None 
 
21 (17%) 
43 (34.6%) 
34 (27.4%) 
26 (21%) 
 
62 (32.6%) 
68 (35.8%) 
42 (22.2%) 
18 (9.4%) 
 
83 (26.4%) 
111 (35.3%) 
76 (24.3%) 
44 (14%) 
 
5.2 Multilingualism and Juba Arabic 
Statistical data drawn from questionnaires cannot realistically reflect the socio-
linguistic situation of a given community, as they depend on the subjective views 
of the respondent in constructing linguistic borders. Nonetheless, some important 
trends can be observed. As a general remark, Juba is, of course, highly multilin-
gual (and more so in the new area of Gudele than in Malikiya), as shown in Table 
2. 
 Half of the population of Gudele claims to speak three languages; Malikiya has 
a slightly but significantly lower multilingualism rate, with 45.2% of the 
interviewees claiming to speak two languages. In both neighbourhoods, at least 
three fourths of the respondents claim to speak either two or three languages. 
 
Table 2. Degree of multilingualism: answers to the question  
‘How many languages do you speak?’. 
 
 Gudele Malikiya Total 
More than 4 8 (6.5%) 6 (2.1%) 14 (4.5%) 
4 languages 31 (25%) 16 (9.5%) 47 (15 %) 
3 languages 63 (50.8%) 69 (36.4%) 132 (42%) 
2 languages 21 (16.9%) 86 (45.2%) 107 (34%) 
1 language 1 (0.8%) 13 (6.8%) 14 (4.5%) 
 
  JUBA ARABIC 219 
 
Within such a multilingual scene Table 3 shows clearly that Juba Arabic is by 
large the first language of socialization for almost half of the respondents. Flying 
in the face of an official policy of utter disregard for Arabic and its speakers, 
(Sudanese) Arabic ranks second, with almost 10% of the interviewees declaring 
Arabic their first language. This figure is of particular interest because it shows 
that people are generally aware of the difference between Juba Arabic and Arabic, 
and they view them as separate languages even in the absence of a direct input 
question from the interviewers. 
 Multilingualism is better reflected in Gudele than in Malikiya. Most 
importantly, Juba Arabic is the only shared medium, with 6.37% only claiming 
not to speak it. The fact that more people do not speak Juba Arabic in Malikiya 
than in Gudele is prima facie odd, but is probably due to the higher impact of 
Arabic, the second language in the neighbourhood. 
 
Table 3. First language: answers to the question:  
‘Which language you have first acquired?’. 
 
 Gudele Malikiya Total 
Juba Arabic 33 (26.6%) 114 (60%) 147 (47%) 
Arabic 5 26 31 (9.8%) 
Bari 6 22 28 (9%) 
Moru 11 8 19 (6%) 
Zande 13 0 13 (4.1%) 
Pojulu 6 6 12 (3.8%) 
Dinka 5 4 9 (2.9%) 
Madi 6 0 6 (2.0%) 
Mundari 6 0 6 (2.0%) 
Baka 5 0 5 (1.6%) 
Kakwa 3 2 5 (1.6%) 
Acholi 3 1 4 (1.3%) 
Kuku 4 0 4 (1.3%) 
Nyangbara 4 0 4 (1.3%) 
Nuer 3 0 3 (1.0%) 
Balanda 3 0 3 (1.0%) 
Other 2 0 2 (0.7%) 
Juba Arabic 
unknown 
7 (5.65%) 13 (6.84%) 20 (6.37%) 
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5.3 Language uses 
Speakers can flexibly call upon different parts of their linguistic repertories to 
achieve effective communication in diverse contexts. This part of the survey was 
intended to assess language uses in four social domains, namely 1) at home, 2) 
within the neighbourhoods, 3) at the market place, and 4) at public offices (see 
Table 4). The use of the different languages is revealing: Juba Arabic is present in 
all of the four investigated domains (even ‘in public offices’, where English and 
Arabic clearly predominate). On the other hand, Juba Arabic is the first medium 
at home, although in competition with other languages. It is still the first home 
language in Malikiya ‒ a sign of a longer history in the town. The differences 
with Gudele, although telling, should not be overstated: in Gudele, Juba Arabic is 
the only home language for a quarter of the interviewees, while another third uses 
it alongside an ethnic language. In both neighbourhoods almost the same 
percentage claims to use an ‘indigenous’ language only at home. Which language 
is of course a matter of the different history of the two neighbourhoods. Juba 
Arabic is the preferred medium to talk with neighbours and, to a lesser extent, at 
the market. 
 
Table 4. Language use: Answers to the question  
‘Which language do you speak most often…?’. 
 
 Gudele Malikiya Total 
At home    
Juba Arabic only 34 (27.5%) 85 (44.7%) 119 (37.8%) 
x+Juba Arabic 40 (32.3%) 54 (28.5%) 94 (30%) 
x only 21 (16.9%) 30 (15.8%) 51 (16.3%) 
Juba Arabic+x 24 (19.3%) 14 (7.4%) 38 (12.1%) 
x+y +Juba Arabic 5 (4%) 7 (3.6%) 12 (3.8%) 
With neighbours 
Juba Arabic only 83 (66.9%) 155 (81.6%) 238 (75.8%) 
x only 8 (6.5%) 25 (13.2%) 33 (10.5%) 
Juba Arabic+x 20 (16.1%) 8 (4.2%) 28 (8.9%) 
x+Juba Arabic 8 (6.5%) 0 8 (2.5%) 
Juba Arabic+x+y 3 (2.4%) 1 (0.5%) 4 (1.4%) 
Other patterns 2 (1.6%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (0.9%) 
At the marketplace 
Juba Arabic only 79 (63.7%) 115 (60.6%) 194 (61.7%) 
Juba Arabic+x 31 (25%) 21 (11.1%) 52 (16.6%) 
x only 8 (6.5%) 25 (13.2%) 33 (10.6%) 
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x+Juba Arabic 2 (1.6%) 18 (9.4%) 20 (6.3%) 
x+y+Juba Arabic 0 7 (3.6%) 7 (2.2%) 
Juba Arabic+x+y 2 (1.6%) 4 (2.1%) 6 (1.9%) 
x+y 2 (1.6%) 0 2 (0.6%) 
At public offices 
English 39 (31.5%) 34 (18%) 73 (23.3%) 
Arabic 5 (4%) 54 (28.7%) 59 (18.8%) 
Juba Arabic 21 (17%) 23 (12.2%) 44 (14%) 
English + Arabic 6 (4.9%) 14 (7.5%) 20 (6.4%) 
English + Juba Arabic 10 (8%) 4 (2.1%) 14 (4.5%) 
Arabic + English 3 (2.4%) 7 (3.8%) 10 (3.2%) 
Juba Arabic + English 8 (6.4%) 2 (1%) 10 (3.2%) 
Other patters including 
Juba Arabic 
1 (0.8%) 13 (6.7%) 14 (4.3%) 
Not applicable 31 (25%) 39 (20.5%) 69 (21.3%) 
  
6 Official discourse  
This section investigates the official discourse about language as expressed by 
government representatives. The analysis is based on formal interviews with two 
government officials of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
recorded in August 2013 in Juba.7 These officials were Mr. Moses Mading, a 
Director of the Department of National Languages at the time of our fieldwork, 
and Mr. Edward Kokole Juma, Director of the Department of Teacher and 
Education Training. The aim of this section is basically to explore the ideologies 
lying behind the regimentation of the linguistic situation of South Sudan as well 
as to assess their possible impact on the language attitudes and language uses (cf. 
sections 2 and 5). We concentrate our attention on the following issues: 
 The definition of ‘indigenous language’. 
 The definition of Juba Arabic vis-à-vis Arabic. 
 The status of monolingual Juba Arabic speakers.  
We first asked the interviewees to elaborate on the meaning of ‘indigenous 
language’; Mr. Moses Mading provided the following answer:  
Indigenous means that, that particular people, grouping, of the languages are 
indigenous, like Murle, like Bari, like Dinka. These are the indigenous 
communities. But they have different languages. These languages were said to 
be dialects or they were said to be local languages. But they are not local, 
because God created languages all the same, what made other language not 
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spread all over the world is that they don’t have power. Like the British they 
invaded all. Like French. So these are languages with power, but they are the 
same.  
Even if Mr. Moses Mading gives a mere tautological definition of ‘indigenous 
language’, the above excerpt is of particular interest for several reasons. First, the 
interviewee argues that there is a direct link between ‘indigenous languages’ and 
a ‘grouping’ of people or ‘indigenous communities’. This reveals an ideological 
understanding of ‘indigenous languages’ as invariable entities. As anticipated in 
section 4, this notion can be traced back to the Rejaf Language Conference, and 
has been more recently implemented by the CPA and the South Sudanese 
language policy (cf. section 3).8 Second, when Mr. Moses Mading affirms that 
‘indigenous languages’ cannot be considered ‘dialects’ nor ‘local languages’ 
because ‘God created languages all the same’, he provides strong evidence of the 
pervasiveness of the SIL faith-based approach to language diversity. However, 
the asserted linguistic ecumenism is evidently incoherent with the position 
expressed vis-à-vis Juba Arabic, which, since not indigenous, is evidently ‘less 
equal’ than others (see below). Third, the reference made to European languages 
‘with power’ can be explained by the assumption that ‘indigenous languages’ 
have been historically subordinate to former colonial languages. This, however, 
reveals that ‘indigenous languages’ as a category cannot be defined without an 
explicit reference to an alien counterpart. 
 Mr. Edward Kokole Juma’s answer to the question of how to define an 
‘indigenous language’ is more articulate, but also much more controversial:  
Long time ago, when we were under the Arabs, all our national languages were 
called indigenous languages. They made them very inferior. Indigenous 
languages, very local languages. Inferior. So our late leader John Garang in 
2004 declared that all indigenous languages in South Sudan are now national 
languages, before the CPA. […] That means to raise a culture, to raise an 
ethnic grouping to national status. Just the languages are promoted from being 
indigenous to be national, because they are a modern system of languages. 
Now you don’t talk of any mother tongue as indigenous, they are all national 
languages. […] When you learn about the background, about the struggle, it 
can tell you that the war was about domination, was about oppression of all 
ethnic languages, to be extinguished, so that people are dominated only to 
speak Arabic. Now we have just liberated ourselves, and we find ourselves that 
Arabic is widely spoken everywhere. Right now in fact is the uniting language, 
the language that unity all the different ethnic groups of South Sudan. We are 
aware about that.  
Here ‘indigenous language’ bears the strong negative connotation of ‘very local’, 
or ‘very inferior’ language. However, the fact that the South Sudanese 
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Constitution overtly cites ‘indigenous languages’ and assigns them the status of 
national languages does not seem to bother the interviewee as incoherent. The 
interviewee further assumes that the adoption of the label ‘indigenous language’ 
is a consequence of the Arabs’ domination in the former unified Sudan, rather 
than of the colonial language policy (cf. section 3). Second, just like Mr. Moses 
Mading, Mr. Edward Kokole Juma argues that there is a direct link between 
‘indigenous languages’ and ‘ethnic groupings’. Furthermore, using a very 
common biological metaphor, Mr. Moses Mading explains that the present-day 
regimentation of ‘indigenous languages’ as ‘national languages’ is a reaction to 
the former domination of Arabic, which was intended to ‘extinguish ethnic 
languages’. In contrast to that, the interviewee also affirms an awareness that 
‘Arabic’ is the only language that can pull ‘the different ethnic groups’ of South 
Sudan together. 
 This leads us to the second issue of our analysis: the definition of Juba Arabic 
vis-à-vis Sudanese Arabic and other languages. Given the confusion surrounding 
the glossonym ‘Arabic’ in his previous statement, we asked Mr. Edward Kokole 
Juma to address the distinction between Juba Arabic and (Sudanese) Arabic:   
Q: Are you speaking of Arabic, or Juba Arabic? 
EKJ: Arabic in general. Juba Arabic has been there before the independence of 
South Sudan itself. People from different parts of South Sudan came to the 
capital city, and that is where Juba Arabic emerged. But in the mind of 
politicians, this idea is not in their mind. It has not been catched in the policy. 
But the policy says in broad terms that all indigenous languages are promoted, 
from indigenous to national languages.  
As a reaction to our question, Mr. Edward Kokole Juma affirms that he is 
referring to Arabic ‘in general’ as he does not acknowledge any particular 
distinction between Juba Arabic and Arabic. At variance with this affirmation, he 
also highlights the longstanding presence of Juba Arabic in South Sudan and, 
distancing himself from the decisional sphere, deplores the fact that this situation 
has not been formalized by the national language policy. 
 Different from Mr. Edward Kokole Juma, Mr. Moses Mading expresses an 
unambiguous position concerning the definition of Juba Arabic in comparison to 
Arabic, as we can see in the following excerpt:  
In this forum we discussed something about Juba Arabic. It was brought up 
that they are no longer using Juba Arabic, they are using classical Arabic. 
Because Arabization here came in and all schools were in Arabic, and they 
were speaking Arabic, everything was done in Arabic. […] Even children who 
are Bari speakers when you, when you, when you hear them, they speak Arabic 
in the streets and all this. You will have Juba Arabic outside. In Lanya, in all 
these areas, Rokon, and all these. So we discussed this thing. The churches, the 
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two churches, Catholic and Protestant. They tried to write what is called 
Shukuru Yesu with Roman alphabet. When we come, when we come as 
linguist, come and test it exactly, it will not come exactly. […] When we 
discussed about Juba Arabic in the forum, they said why to write with Roman 
script, Juba Arabic with roman script, if we have rules already for Arabic. 
Arabic will be used of course; even in the churches we have Arabic bibles. So 
it can be like that Arabic, while we use the ‘mother tongue’. […] So Juba 
Arabic will not written in the Roman script. Because we have rules already. 
Arabic will be though in P5. 
Q: But it will be Arabic… 
MM: Yes, it will be Arabic. Not Juba Arabic, it will be Arabic. 
Q: Is Juba Arabic different from Arabic? 
MM: It is not different from Arabic. It’s a dialectical thing. […] Arabic came 
during the time of the Turkish rule, they were using some of the people and 
recruited them in the army. So they have been ordered in Arabic like that. So 
they used what is called colloquial Arabic. But now after Arabization came 
here. Now when they speak orally, they speak very clear Arabic.  
The interviewee makes reference to a ‘forum’ in which the status of Juba Arabic 
was discussed. That is the Practice and Planning of Multilingual Education 
Workshop, organized by SIL and the government of South Sudan in 2006, and 
which was intended to make proposals on the choice of the ‘indigenous 
languages’ to be used in primary education (Ferdinand, Mading, Marshall and 
Spronk, 2008; Spronk, 2014). According to Mr. Moses Mading, during the 
workshop it was argued that, because of the institutional Arabicization of the 
former unified Sudan, Juba Arabic is no longer spoken, except in rural areas such 
as ‘Lanya’ or ‘Rokon’. This is evidently in contrast with the fact that Juba Arabic 
is mainly spoken in Juba where it is undergoing a massive process of nativization, 
while being a vehicular language in the rural areas. Accordingly, it seems that the 
interviewee identifies Juba Arabic with its pidginized version characteristic of 
rural speakers, rather than with the creolized form that is widely used in the 
capital city. It should also be stressed that the influence of Sudanese Arabic on 
Juba Arabic in terms of decreolization (cf. section 2) is particularly evident in the 
South Sudanese capital as a result of the recent arrival of returnees from 
Khartoum; this may have had an influence on the interviewee’s assumption that 
Juba Arabic has been replaced by ‘classical Arabic’, where this latter term 
obviously refers to Sudanese Arabic (perceived as the high linguistic variety in 
terms of prestige). Finally, the interviewee affirms that there have been some 
attempts to standardize a Juba Arabic orthography in the Roman alphabet, but 
these failed because there are already orthographic rules for Arabic. Mr. Moses 
Mading thus states that Arabic should be taught as a foreigner language starting 
from P5 and not as an ‘indigenous language’ starting from P1. This statement led 
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us to ask the question whether Juba Arabic is different from (Sudanese) Arabic. In 
this connection, the interviewee makes clear that in his understanding Juba Arabic 
‘is not different from Arabic’ since it is ‘a dialectical thing’ and that at the present 
time people speak ‘very clear Arabic’. This means that, in contrast with the 
metalinguistic representations expressed by the majority of Juba Arabic speakers, 
the interviewee overtly considers Juba Arabic as a variety of the former dominant 
language. 
 As a last point, during the interview with Mr. Moses Mading we drew his 
attention to the presence of Juba Arabic monolinguals in South Sudan:  
Q: In urban centres like Juba you find children who only speak Arabic or, let 
say, some form of Arabic, like Juba Arabic. 
MM: Some of them came from East Africa. They came from east Africa. 
Q: Some of them. But, as you observed, there are also people who say: we are 
Bari, but we only speak Juba Arabic. So, will these people learn Bari at the 
primary school or will they study directly in English? 
MM: What we are putting is a policy. They are Bari, of course. And if they are 
Bari, they must know their mother tongue. […] It is the system; they must 
know their mother tongue. Because their fathers and their mothers, they speak 
Bari.  
Mr. Moses Mading overtly affirms that Juba Arabic monolingual speakers are 
returnees from East Africa; by doing that, he denies these ‘outsiders’ any 
linguistic right in South Sudan. However, this does not correspond to the 
sociolinguistic profile of the majority of Juba Arabic monolinguals, who are 
basically South Sudanese individuals born and raised in the capital. We therefore 
urged Mr. Moses Mading to comment on the presence of Juba Arabic 
monolinguals that preserve their ethnic identity (as in the case of many Bari 
located in Malikiya, cf. section 5) and on the language to be adopted for their 
primary education. The answer given by the interviewee does not leave any 
doubt: by affirming ‘if they are Bari, they must know their mother tongue’, he 
overtly states that the first and foremost criterion for choosing an ‘indigenous 
language’ for primary education is neither location nor language use, but ethnic 
affiliation. In such an ideological context, it is evident that a non-ethnic language 
such as Juba Arabic has no room. 
 We can sum up the main points of the official discourse towards Juba Arabic 
as follows: 
 As an ideological reaction to the process of Arabicization enacted by the 
former unified Sudan, Juba Arabic is considered as a variety of Arabic. 
It is therefore not recognized as a ‘national language’. 
 Being an inter-ethnic means of communication, Juba Arabic cannot fit 
with the ethnic understanding of ‘indigenous languages’ inherited from 
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the colonial language policy and renewed by the CPA, and South 
Sudanese independence. 
 Despite the fact that linguistic rights are formally recognized on the 
basis of language uses, ethnic membership remains the foremost factor 
underlying the choice of ‘indigenous languages’ in education. As a 
consequence, Juba Arabic monolinguals do not have a statutory right to 
education in their own language, and they will be forced to learn an 
‘indigenous’ language. 
 It seems that the official discourse does not affect the metalinguistic 
awareness of Juba Arabic speakers, as they tend to make a clear 
distinction between the pidgincreole and its lexifier (cf. section 2). 
Likewise, the fact that Juba Arabic is not recognized as a national 
language does not limit its use as a vehicular language and its ongoing 
nativization (cf. section 3). 
  
7 Conclusions  
The analysis of the official discourse revealed that the non-recognition of the 
pidgincreole could be explained by different ideological factors. First, despite its 
linguistic and sociohistorical peculiarities, Juba Arabic is officially considered a 
variety of Arabic. It is not constitutionally recognized as an ‘indigenous language’ 
on a par with other South Sudanese languages, and it will not be standardized 
and/or taught in primary schools. Secondly, being an interethnic means of 
communication, Juba Arabic cannot be linked to any specific ethnic group. As a 
consequence, the sociolinguistic status of Juba Arabic does not fit with the ethnic 
understanding of ‘indigenous languages’ promulgated, at first, by the British 
colonial rule and boosted, at a later time, by the CPA. Even if ‘indigenous’ 
languages are formally recognized on the basis of location and language uses, the 
analysis of the official discourse clearly shows that the individuation of an 
ethnically defined linguistic community remains the main principle underlying the 
recognition of linguistic rights in South Sudan. 
 In this overall situation, ideology is not absent in the speakers’ attitudes toward 
language(s), and it is apparent for example in a frequently heard nationalist 
statement about Juba Arabic being ‘the language which unites South Sudanese 
people’ (Manfredi 2017b). Despite this, pragmatic considerations play a much 
bigger role than ideology: the speakers stress the usefulness of an already existing 
local lingua franca in order to surmount the problems inherent in everyday 
communication. The relative weight of ideology and practical considerations is 
reversed in the case of the government’s perception of the language problem. The 
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choice of English as the language of education may be supported by economic 
and practical considerations, whereas the recognition of indigenous languages 
may be seen as a tactical move to prevent possible criticisms of a lack of attention 
to the diversity of the country; but ideological considerations had the upper hand 
in the choice of English as the sole official language of the country, in spite of the 
fact that it is barely if at all known by the vast majority of the South Sudanese. 
‘Indigenous languages’, for their part, are mentioned in the Constitution, but Juba 
Arabic, which is considered a ‘non-indigenous’ language, is not. This state of 
affairs is potentially harmful when considering the fast process of nativization of 
Juba Arabic in post-independence South Sudan (cf. section 5). 
  
Notes  
1. A previous version of this article was entitled ‘A new state, an old language 
policy, and a pidgincreole: Juba Arabic in South Sudan’. 
2. Fieldwork in South Sudan was made possible by a grant from the Italian 
Ministry of Education, University and Research within the project ‘Areas of 
Linguistic and Cultural Transition in Africa’ (ATrA). Our partner in South 
Sudan was the Department of Arabic at the University of Juba. We thank its 
Director, Prof. Siham Osman, for her assistance in the field. We express our 
gratitude to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, which allowed 
us to carry out a number of interviews with key officials. We also thank the 
Embassy of France for their logistical help. We are especially thankful to our 
language consultants, and in particular to Lowani Duku Dimas, who passed 
away on 12 April 2014. 
3. Interestingly, Leonardi (2013) insists on the structural distinctiveness of Juba 
Arabic. However, this is not reflected in the choice of the glossonym ‘South 
Sudanese Arabic’, which does not highlight the specificity of Juba Arabic but 
posits a connection between the South Sudanese pidgincreole and common 
Arabic national koines such as ‘Egyptian Arabic’, ‘Sudanese Arabic’, etc. 
4. At the time of our fieldwork, Juba was the capital city of the Central Equatoria 
state. Following the 2015 federal reform, Central Equatoria was dissolved, and 
Juba now falls within the new state of Jubek. 
5. Spronk (2014), a SIL member collaborating with the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology on the definition of the guidelines of multilingual 
education of South Sudan, overtly uses the disputed term ‘mother tongue’. Not 
surprisingly, the same term also crops up in the discourse of government 
officials who worked with SIL when referring back to ‘indigenous’ languages 
(cf. section 6). 
6. The data were gathered through anonymous interviews carried out by two 
students, Claudius Waran Patrick and Sara Bojo Lokudu, from Juba University. 
Interviews were conducted in Juba Arabic and were written down and tabulated 
by us. 
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7. The interviews were conducted in English. The excerpts presented in this 
paragraph are transcribed orthographically. We did not correct morphosyntactic 
and/or lexical incongruences. 
8. One of the main aims of the Rejaf Language Conference was ‘to make 
recommendations as to whether a system of group languages should be adopted 
for educational purposes, and if so, what languages would be selected as the 
group languages for the various areas (of the Southern Sudan)’. In this regard, 
Abdelhay, Makoni, Makoni and Mugaddam (2011:470–471) observe that ‘The 
lasting effect of the Rejaf Language Conference as a language-planning device 
was the production of a linguistic cartography of “immobile languages” 
anchored to a specific space: the South’. 
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